Sangana Ghosh
Symbiosis School for Liberal Arts
Symbiosis International (Deemed University)
On February 24, 2022, the European global and security architecture was shaken up when the Russian government under the present Russian President, Vladimir Putin launched a full-fledged invasion on Ukraine. It has been more than two years now, and the war, still ongoing to this day, has turned into a prolonged war of attrition (Hughes, 2023). This war has drastically changed the lives of millions of civilians and has led to the launch of unprecedented sanctions on the Russian economy, a refugee crisis and most importantly, shook-up the ties between major powers, the United States of America (US) and Russia (Neuman & Hurt, 2023). Thus, becoming a multi-faceted conflict with the potential for inflicting even greater disaster in the future.
Russia & Ukraine: A Tangled History
This ongoing conflict is a dramatic escalation of a conflict which started eight years ago with Russia’s annexation of Crimea (Kablan, 2021).The relationship between Ukraine and Russia dates back to the 10th century. At that time, Kyiv was the heart of Kyivan Rus, the birthplace of both Ukraine and Russia. This shared history has led to the cultural closeness of these two nations which can be observed even today (Raj & Singh, 2023). However, at present, these nations are fighting against each other in the bloodiest war that Europe has ever seen since the end of World War II (Sawal et al., 2022).
The Mongol invasion in 1240 fragmented Kyivan Rus into present-day Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In the 14th century, Kyiv and its environs fell under the control of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. After this, Russia annexed Ukraine in 1783, making Crimea a constituent territory of the Russian empire, which remained part of Russia until it was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. Before this, during the 19th century, the Russian Empire initiated a process of russification in Ukraine to bolster its control in Ukraine. However, Ukraine became a sovereign state in 1991 and gave away its nuclear arsenal to Russia by signing the Budapest Agreement in 1994 (Sawal et al., 2022). According to this agreement, the United States, Russia and Britain agreed to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, existing borders and to refrain from threatening or using force against the country (Pifer, 2019). In spite of the agreement, the peaceful relations which Russia and Ukraine aimed to achieve were short-lived.
The roots of the current conflict can be traced back to 2004 Orange Revolution, which arose from allegations of electoral fraud favoring pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. This led to the Ukrainian Supreme Court annulling the election and Viktor Yushchenko, a member of Our Ukraine- People’s Self-Defense Bloc and known for his pro-market and monetarist views, became the winner after re-election. After Yushchenko became the President, Ukraine’s pursuit of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership began. In 2013, the pro-Russian President Yanukovych, who had won the 2010 elections against Yulia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko, refused to sign the EU Association Agreement and was ousted. After this, Russia annexed Crimea and portrayed support for separatist movements in Donetsk and Luhansk Nation Republics (DNR and LNR) of eastern Ukraine, areas populated predominantly by ethnic Russians (Raj & Singh, 2023). In response, NATO and the US increased their military presence in Eastern Europe, deploying battalions in 2016 and US tank brigades to Poland in 2017. In October 2018, Ukraine, the US and NATO conducted major air exercises, prompting Russia to hold its largest military drills since the Soviet era (Sawal et al., 2022). This history underscores the escalating tensions between the West and Russia over the years.
The Kremlin’s Case: Justifying the Invasion of Ukraine
When Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin framed it as a “special military operation” aimed at protecting Ukrainians from alleged bullying and genocide. He claimed this military action was necessary to stop Ukrainian attacks on the breakaway regions of DNR and LNR, which Russia had earlier unilaterally recognized as independent states (Fisher, 2022). On these lines, Wade (2022) highlights that when the predominantly Russian-speaking and Russian orthodox populations in the eastern provinces of DNR and LNR voted for independence from Ukraine, the government in Kyiv initiated attacks on the people of these regions to suppress their resistance.
In order to gain as much public support as possible, Putin also portrayed the war as a preventive war with a strategic rationale in response to the attempts of NATO to gain a foothold in Ukraine. According to Putin, Ukraine was becoming a “springboard” for Western aggression and thus, the 2022 invasion was a pre-emptive strike to protect Russia’s interests in Eastern Europe (Fisher, 2022). This was because during the Bucharest Summit in 2008, NATO allies agreed to give Ukraine NATO membership. Therefore, Putin’s actions were motivated by his desire to ensure Ukraine’s neutrality. Putin justified his actions by asserting that the West deceived the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) by breaking promises regarding NATO’s expansion made at the end of the Cold War. In his 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, he accused the West of violating verbal assurances by US President Reagan to USSR Secretary General Gorbachev in December 1988 that NATO would not expand into former East Germany if Russia accepted Germany’s unification (Raza, 2023; National Security Archive, 2017). Putin claimed that he had attempted diplomatic solutions, but the West rejected his proposals, making the military operation a “last-ditch” effort to protect Russia from a potentially hostile military alliance. Meanwhile, demilitarization was another objective of Putin for his military action. The West had been arming Ukraine and training its military for a long time, this was perceived as an existential threat by the Russian government suggesting that Russia could come under attack by Ukraine’s far-right government unless their influence was diminished (Rácz, 2023). Thus, according to Putin, demilitarization was necessary.
While laying out his reasons for launching the operation, Putin also illustrated that according to him, Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” who effectively occupy “the same historical and spiritual space” (Masters, 2023). He believed that Kyiv was the “mother of all Russian cities” (Putin, 2021) and thus, he felt that it was his responsibility to denazify Ukraine. While the previously mentioned reasons can be analyzed for validity, according to me, the necessity to denazify Ukraine was an implausible claim since Putin did not publicly elaborate/specify on the need for denazification. This rhetoric was created to demonstrate that Russia was fighting against evil but this was a factually wrong claim. Additionally, even though Putin had earlier signed the Budapest Memorandum, he declared that modern-day Ukraine was wholly created by Russia therefore, he doesn’t consider Ukraine as a “real country” (Masters, 2023).
From Kyiv: Ukraine’s Take on Russia’s Invasion
Since 2014, Ukrainian citizens have faced partial occupation and annexation, culminating in a direct military assault in 2022. Even though for Russia this war is about achieving some goals, the Ukrainian narrative is that it is a fight for survival of their country, national identity and culture. President Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelenskyy, in a speech on the eve of the invasion, urged all Ukrainians to defend their homeland and called on Ukrainians abroad to return and help (BBC, 2022). Furthermore, Zelensky sought global solidarity, with him and his officials giving interviews to international media in the early days of the war, despite the risks to their personal safety.
The primary narrative in Ukraine is that Putin’s actions are driven by a desire to expand Russia’s territorial influence. This is because Ukraine, led by president Zelenskyy, perceives Putin as a “man with a mission,” to secure his place in Russian history. This perspective aligns with Russia’s historical resentment against the West (Hughes, 2023). Russia’s annexation of Crimea followed by failed attempts to integrate Ukraine into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was interpreted as a strategic move to pave the way for Russian hegemony. For Ukraine, Russia’s actions depicted a resemblance between Russia and the USSR, which also resorted to the use of force during the Cold War in states such as Czechoslovakia which pursued policies that were disapproved by Moscow. This portrays that the case made by Ukraine is that Russia is a declining power and Putin, having a revisionist mindset, wants to gain control over states which were under the USSR to re-establish itself as a great power (Berebon, 2023).
Michael Howard’s quote, “War is the result of an illegitimate domestic system that aims to use war not for glory or survival but for feeding the corrupt system” (Berebon, 2023, p.95), encapsulates Ukraine’s view on the war’s causes. According to this perspective, authoritarian Russia feared that Ukraine’s democratic influence could destabilize its regime, prompting Russia to attack Ukraine to safeguard against internal dissent (Berebon, 2023). Another reason, acknowledged by Ukraine, is that Russia perceived weakness in Western responses to its attacks in Georgia and Crimea, leading to the belief it could similarly attack democratic Ukraine (Samadashvili, 2022). This view also stems from the notion that Russia is an illiberal democracy and has expansionist tendencies.
US President Joe Biden, has framed this conflict as a fundamental ideological struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, using the defense of democratic values as a unifying narrative. This rhetoric has reinstated the United States’ role in leading the “free world,” resulting in significant American involvement since the war’s inception (Ash et al., 2023). Along with the US, Ukraine has also received consistent backing from Western allies, notably NATO and the European Union (EU). They have provided extensive military, financial, technical, and humanitarian aid (Council of European Union, 2024). After framing the events in such a way, in response, the Ukrainian government declared martial law which even included possible bans on pro-Kremlin parties.
Decoding the Blame-Game: Examining the Reasons for the Breakout of the Russo-Ukrainian War
I adhere to the principle that no war is justifiable and no rationale can validate initiating war against another country. Therefore, Russia must be condemned for starting the Russo-Ukrainian war. A, in a war, not only do the contending parties face the horrors, but the entire world is also susceptible to its ripple effects. Additionally, Russia’s occupation of a sovereign state contravenes international law and norms related to territory, borders, and warfare (Dodds et al., 2023). However, I don’t see this conflict as a battle between might and right; it stems from both tangible material and intangible interests of Russia and Ukraine, making the responsibility for its outbreak shared. I also subscribe to the notion that although national security and power maximization are overarching goals for every state; domestic politics, perceptions and individual leaders shape how states pursue these objectives. Therefore, states, in this case, Russia and Ukraine should not be treated like “black-boxes” i.e unitary rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2012).
I contend that the US also shares responsibility for the war’s outbreak. After the declaration of NATO expansions, the Kremlin proposed treaties to implement the Minsk peace accords, dissolve right-wing Ukrainian militias, and negotiate a new European security architecture, but the US refused to negotiate, rather it exacerbated the tensions. Mr. Burns, a career Senior Foreign Service Officer of the US, even warned that “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite, not just Putin” (Mearsheimer, 2022). Thus, I believe, the U.S. should have addressed Russia’s concerns to prevent the latent conflict from taking the form of a manifest conflict. Moreover, I believe the US’ actions indirectly encouraged Russia to invade Ukraine. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, justified as a “war on terrorism,” set a precedent for unilateral military action. The Iraq war, in particular, demonstrated that a country could invade another with impunity. The invasions launched by the US might have led President Putin to likely perceive rational grounds for invading Ukraine.
Furthermore, following the USSR’s collapse, Russia under President Vladimir Putin, became a major energy power, supplying a significant portion of Europe’s natural gas and crude oil. Putin saw an opportunity in this and integrated economic policy with geopolitical strategy. Notably after the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Gazprom, Russia’s state controlled energy company, pressured Ukraine by cutting gas supplies. This move highlighted Ukraine can’t be depended on as a transit country and supported the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, directly supplying gas to Germany and bypassing Ukraine. By 2020, Germany’s dependence on Russian gas had increased, and the completion of Nord Stream 2 in 2021 promised to further enhance this dependency, raising concerns about the loss of transit fees for Ukraine and Poland. The U.S. pressured against Nord Stream 2, fearing it would increase Russian influence in Europe. Finally, in response to Russia’s recognition of separatist regions of DNR and LNR in Ukraine, Germany, influenced by the West, halted Nord Stream 2’s certification in February, 2022. This suspension deprived Russia of a strategic asset, escalating tensions and contributing to its decision to invade Ukraine (Krishna, 2022). Therefore, the U.S.’s efforts to influence European energy policy were instrumental in shaping the geopolitical landscape that precipitated this conflict.
Another underlying reason for which the US provoked and participated in this war is because U.S. neo-conservatives saw the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an opportunity to fuel a war benefiting American businesses. They argue that supporting Ukraine aligns with U.S. strategic interests and moral obligations while also being economically advantageous. Tom Fairless (2024) indicated that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. defense industry has seen a surge in demand for weapons and munitions. This highlights a dual rationale behind U.S. support for the Ukraine war i.e geopolitical strategy and economic benefit.
The Russia-Ukraine war has also been fuelled by irresponsible leadership from Zelensky, Putin, and Biden. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine violated the Budapest Memorandum, demonstrating significant irresponsibility. Meanwhile, Zelensky’s unwavering hardline stance precludes any compromise that might end the conflict. Zelensky has organized peace summits without Russian participation, focusing on issues like nuclear safety, humanitarian aid, and food security and lacking substantive peace proposals (Sharma, 2024). Similarly, Putin’s peace proposals are tailored to his own interests, rendering genuine peace unattainable. Therefore, it is imperative for both Zelensky and Putin to embrace diplomacy and engage in negotiations because the war might also lead to the use of nuclear weapons.
The U.S. must also demonstrate responsibility by ceasing to promote democracy as the best form of government. The US often lectures other nations on governance, asserting the primacy of democracy. However, despite the apparent unity of the West, its global influence has not necessarily increased. This unity coincides with the rise of a post-Western world where other powers no longer follow Western directives. The West must adapt to a multipolar world, coexisting with hostile dictatorships like China and Russia, as well as independent powers like India and Turkey.
Conflict to Coexistence: Ending Hostilities in Ukraine
Wars are easier to start than finish, and their finales rarely follow a prescribed script (Walt, 2022). This statement is also true for the Russia-Ukraine war. This war has almost reached a stalemate with Ukraine’s counteroffensive stalled due to inadequate Western resupply, while Russia managed to replace some combat losses and evade the full effects of sanctions. Given the situation, a ceasefire indicating a draw seems likely, which would be framed as a Russian victory and require NATO and Ukraine to negotiate a territorial settlement, bolstering Russia’s status as a Great Power (Acuff & Clegg, 2024). However, this conflict underscores the need for conventional arms control for European security, as nuclear deterrence alone was insufficient to prevent this war. Therefore, to ensure future stability, confidence-building measures and arms control are crucial (Joachim, 2023). Efforts must also focus on achieving both negative and positive peace. Design thinking, with its dynamic, iterative approach, is well-suited for peacebuilding in this case. By engaging communities and fostering trust, design thinking can create sustainable solutions to conflict and violence, essential for achieving positive peace (Siragusa, 2023).
Conclusion
This commentary has traced the historical conflicts and interdependencies between Ukraine and Russia, detailing Putin’s justifications for initiating the war and exploring the perspectives of both nations. The analysis reveals that Russia, Ukraine, and the West share responsibility for the conflict. The commentary emphasizes the urgent need for diplomatic efforts and responsible leadership to end the hostilities and once the war concludes, sustained efforts must focus on establishing positive peace and ensuring long-term stability and reconciliation in the region.
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